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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the post-acquisition performance of 384 unquoted owner-managed firms that have 
been acquired between 2000 and 2004, and compare it with 875 comparable, but independent 
owner-managed firms. We show that target firms in domestic acquisitions are less profitable and 
grow less than independent firms, both before and after the acquisition. Target firms in cross-
border acquisitions are comparable to independent firms in growth and profitability, but they have 
higher margins and higher returns after the acquisition. Hence, our findings indicate that especially 
cross-border acquisitions create operational synergies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     Thus far, entrepreneurship research has only started to investigate the ways in which 
entrepreneurs exit their firms and the consequences this exit has on the entrepreneur and the firm 
(Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne and Cardon, 2009). When an entrepreneur exits, the firm can 
either be terminated (through liquidation or bankruptcy) or be acquired and continue under new 
ownership (Leroy, Manigart and Meuleman, 2009). An acquisition is often considered as the most 
desirable outcome of entrepreneurial exit, as it is assumed that an acquisition allows more 
economic wealth to be preserved for both the entrepreneur and other stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers or customers (DeTienne, 2009). It is a common exit route, as it is estimated 
that around 35% of owner-managed firms are eventually acquired, rather than liquidated 
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(excluding bankruptcies) (Leroy et al., 2009; Wennberg et al., 2009). Despite its importance in the 
entrepreneurial life cycle, few studies investigated what happens to a target firm after an
 acquisition. While there are numerous studies on the expected or realized post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms, there is a dearth of studies on the target’s perspective. 
 
     The goal of the present study is hence to deepen our understanding of how the economic 
performance of acquired owner-managed companies develops after an acquisition. Competing 
forces may be at work in an acquired firm, either leading to positive or negative performance 
effects. For example, operational synergies may lead to acquired firms performing better (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Luypaert and Huyghebaert, 2009). On the other hand, a poor culture fit and 
post-acquisition integration problems may lead to negative performance effects (Powell and Stark, 
2005). Further, technology companies may be acquired for their intellectual property rights, 
potentially leading to post-acquisition downsizing (Schweizer, 2005). Hence, the impact of an 
acquisition on a target firm’s economic performance still remains a question. 
 
     Second, we allow for heterogeneity in acquisitions by differentiating between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions. While the vast majority of the academic literature on acquisitions 
studies domestic acquisitions, a significant fraction of acquisitions involves firms from different 
countries. Distinguishing between domestic and cross-border acquisitions is important, as 
synergies may be more challenging to implement in cross-border acquisitions than in domestic 
acquisitions. On the other hand, the resource based view of the firm suggests that cultural distance 
may also lead to better performance because previously not available routines may now be freely 
accessible within the target firm (Ghoshal, 1987; Mayrhofer, 2004). The two competing views 
suggest that it is worthwhile further investigating how domestic or cross-border acquisitions may 
impact the economic development of a target firm. Further, what has been written about cross-
border acquisitions has mainly focused on U.S. public firms (Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2009). 
Studying the post-acquisition performance of owner-managed non-U.S. firms is hence timely. 
 
     The research questions are empirically investigated on a sample of 384 non-financial, 
unquoted, Flemish2 firms that have been acquired between 2000 and 2004. Firm data consist of 
accounting variables from one year before the acquisition up to four years after the acquisition. 
The economic performance of acquired firms is compared to that of 875 comparable, but still 
independent owner-managed firms, during the same time period. We consider different sources of 
economic performance enhancement. We start with growth in sales and profit margins. Next, we 
consider efficiency improvements such as asset turnover and return on assets. We hereby focus on 
effective post-acquisition value creation, rather than on expected value creation as in most event 
studies. 
 
     We show that acquisition targets are, on average, underperforming before the acquisition 
compared to independent firms. More precisely, target firms of domestic acquirers have a lower 
pre-acquisition sales growth and a lower margin compared to independent firms. Target firms of 
cross-border acquirers are comparable to independent firms before the acquisition, except that 
their return on assets (but neither their margin, nor their growth) is significantly lower, suggesting 
that they use their assets less efficiently. After the acquisition, domestic targets continue to 
underperform compared to independent firms. The performance of cross-border acquisitions 
develops differently, however. Their sales growth is comparable to that of independent companies, 
but their margins improve leading to significantly higher margins compared to independent 
companies as from the first post-acquisition year onwards. Return on assets, however, is only 
significantly higher four years after the acquisition, suggesting that independent companies use 
their assets more efficiently. Our results hence suggest that synergies positively impact post-
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acquisition performance of the target company in a cross-border acquisition (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999), but synergies are more important in improving internal efficiency through cost 
reduction rather than in enhancing revenues. Surprisingly, synergies are absent in domestic 
takeovers. Distinguishing between domestic and cross-border acquisitions is relevant, as we show 
that domestic acquisitions involve a different type of company and that the post-acquisition 
evolution is very different. 
 
     The paper proceeds as follows. The next section starts from the available literature to develop 
testable hypotheses. Thereafter, the empirical strategy is presented, including a description of the 
sample and data. The results are presented next, and a discussion concludes the paper. 
 
THEORY 
 
     While there are numerous studies on the impact of acquisitions on quoted companies, there is 
little evidence on the performance effects of acquisitions of private target companies up to now. 
Positive performance effects are typically attributed to the potential to create synergies through an 
acquisition, referring to the ability of the combined firm to create more value than the sum of the 
values of the two stand-alone firms (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Alternatively, acquisitions 
may lead the acquired company to underperform, for example due to poor culture fit between 
acquirer and target or due to post-acquisition integration problems (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
Further, in the context of entrepreneurial exits, the fact that the entrepreneur as driving force of the 
organization is leaving may also lead to a negative performance effect (Ooghe, Van Laere and De 
Langhe, 2006). We will first expand on the expected post-acquisition performance effect in 
general, and thereafter theorize on expected differences between domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. 
 
The Post-Acquisition Operating Performance of Owner-Managed Target Firms 
 
     The question of whether operating performance improvements arise from corporate 
acquisitions is one that has been addressed by many researchers over the last decades (Powell and 
Stark, 2005). Scholars typically estimate the expected gains from acquisitions by measuring the 
market reaction to acquisition announcements for shareholders of both the acquirer and the target 
firm (e.g. Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy, 2009) or by analyzing the post-acquisition 
operating cash flows of the combined firms (e.g. Powell and Stark, 2005). Most studies report 
significant and positive industry-adjusted gains from the acquisitions that financial markets can 
predict to some extent (Powell and Stark, 2005). Gains in market value or in operational cash 
flows may accrue from different strategies, however. Firms may increase their sales, improve their 
operational efficiency through cost savings or use their asset base more efficiently. Most U.S. 
studies report that synergy realizations are mainly driven by cost savings and cutback in 
investments, while European studies find that enhancing sales is also an important driver of 
performance increases (Capron, 1999; Luypaert and Huyghebaert, 2009). Hence, we will consider 
the different types of operational value creation. 
 
     Post-acquisition sales of the acquired company may increase thanks to leveraging on the 
acquirer’s tangible and intangible resources. For example, the distribution channels and customer 
base of the parent company may be exploited to sell the target’s products (Schweizer, 2005) or the 
reputation of the parent company may legitimize the target’s products (Gaughan, 2002). Further, 
the acquired company may benefit from stronger managerial capabilities in the parent company. In 
the long term, research and development in the parent company may benefit the products of the 
acquired company by enhancing their features (Capron, 1999). Higher sales levels may also be a 
consequence of increased market power of the combined firm. A decrease in competition may 
allow the combined firm to increase sales prices, leading to higher revenues with the same level of 
output (Kim and Singal, 1993). 
 
     There are, however, also reasons to expect sales to drop after an acquisition. First, 
entrepreneurs are often seen as the driving forces of their firms, with customers often identifying 
with them. When the entrepreneur exits, this may hence negatively affect the buying behavior of 
the (former) customers. Further, the parent company will install new reporting and control 
structures to integrate the acquired company. These new structures may not be fully adapted to the 
target firm’s needs and increase the bureaucracy within the previously entrepreneurially oriented 
company to such an extent that it hampers flexibility, thereby reducing sales. The managers that 
stay on board of the acquired firm may be less motivated when their firm loses its autonomy to the 
new parent company (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Finally, an owner-managed firm may not 
be acquired for its sales potential, but for its intellectual property rights. This may ultimately lead 
to underinvestment in sales efforts and ensuing loss of sales (Bobelyn, Maesen and Clarysse, 
2007). The effect of the acquisition of an owner-managed firm on the development of its sales is 
hence dubious. 
 
     Profits and cash flows may increase even if sales remain constant, as synergy gains may also be 
realized through either efficiency gains or increased market power (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and 
Zulehner, 2003). Efficiency gains are driven by a more efficient use of the available resources, 
leading to either economies of scale or economies of scope. Economies of scale result from 
spreading fixed costs (e.g. R&D or marketing expenses) over higher output levels, but also from 
an increased specialization of labor and management and a more efficient use of capital equipment 
(Gaughan, 2002; Devos et al., 2009). Economies of scope arise when the costs of producing 
multiple products in one company are lower than having them produced in separate firms 
(Luypaert and Huyghebaert, 2009). The latter cost savings may show up when two firms can share 
a unique resource, for example technology or distribution channels (Nayyar, 1993). Lower relative 
costs may also be a consequence of increased market power, as the combined firm may have 
stronger bargaining power towards its suppliers, potentially leading to lower input prices (Gugler 
et al., 2003). 
 
     Acquired owner-managed firms may on the one hand benefit from increased market power and 
economies of scale and scope, but on the other hand suffer from higher reporting and control costs 
imposed by the parent company. Further, the parent company may impose transfer costs for 
administrative and managerial expenses, occurred at headquarter level. These may be significantly 
higher than comparable costs in the pre-acquisition situation. Again, the expected impact of a 
merger on relative cost efficiency and firm margins is unclear. 
 
     A third source of post-acquisition operational value creation is through cutbacks in investment 
expenditures (Capron, 1999; Devos et al., 2009). When two companies combine, they can improve 
the efficiency of their investments by sharing particular assets, like a common office building or a 
factory, and by divesting redundant ones. Further, stronger managerial discipline may result in a 
more efficient use of net working capital (Luypaert and Huyghebaert, 2009). Hence, we expect 
that the post-acquisition asset turnover will improve. 
 
Domestic versus Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 
     Whether the firm is acquired by a domestic company or a cross-border company may have far-
reaching consequences for its post-acquisition performance, however. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) report that the change in operating performance in cross-border acquisitions is significantly 
lower than in domestic deals, but acquirers are able to benefit more from target R&D expertise in 
cross-border acquisitions, thereby improving their own capabilities to innovate (Eun, Kolodny and 
Scheraga, 1996). 
 
     Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2009) expect cross-border acquisitions to result in larger revenue-
based synergies for the combined company. The increase in sales due to the sharing of 
complementary resources, like distribution channels or brand names, tends to be larger when the 
acquisition involves firms with a different nationality, because of a more limited geographical 
overlap of the combining firms. 
 
     In contrast, economies of scale can be realized more easily when bidder and target firms have 
their headquarters in the same country, thanks to lower cultural differences between the target and 
acquirer (Brock, 2005). This decreases uncertainties (Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997) and post-
acquisition integration costs (Cartwright and Price, 2003; Hofstede, 1980). Further, potential 
conflicts between employees may be lower in domestic deals (Brock, Barry and Thomas, 2000). 
This leads to lower expected efficiency gains and margin improvements in cross-border 
acquisitions compared to domestic acquisitions (Luypaert and Huyghebaert, 2009).  
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Sample 
 
     To explore our research questions, we analyze a sample of 384 acquisitions (of which 175 
cross-border) of Flemish, non-financial, unquoted firms between 2000 and 2004. These 
acquisitions were selected using the Zephyr3 database, based upon following criteria. First, we 
focused on target firms located in Flanders. Second, acquisitions had to be completed within the 
period 2000-2004, in order to allow analyzing the post-acquisition growth and performance. Third, 
and consistent with previous research, we excluded targets active in the Banking, Insurance or 
Financial Services Industry, because financial companies have different financial structures and 
reporting requirements. Fourth, only deals with non-private equity acquirers were retained, as 
private equity firms have typically different goals and objectives compared to corporate acquirers. 
Fifth, only acquisitions where the acquirer acquired 100% of the target’s stock were retained, in 
order not to have confounding shareholder effects. All targets in our sample remain separate legal 
entities with individual financial statements after the acquisition, however, allowing analyzing 
their post-acquisition performance4. Finally, 25 cases had to be dropped due to data unavailability. 
The acquisitions, dropped from the initial population due to data availability or lack of financial 
statement information, do not differ significantly from those retained in the sample. 
 
     To compare the performance of acquired and independent firms, a second sample was 
constructed, consisting of 875 owner-managed firms with the same characteristics but which 
remained independent between 2000 and 2004. Following this methodology, we matched our 
sample of 175 cross-border acquisitions to independent firms along the following dimensions: 
location, industry, age and size. To distinguish between small, medium and large firms, we 
defined a small firm as a firm that employs less than 50 employees, from which the yearly total 
assets do not exceed 5 million euro or the yearly sales do not exceed 7 million euro and that 
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complies with the independency criterion. A medium sized firm is a firm with less than 250 
employees, from which the yearly sales do not exceed 40 million euro or the yearly total assets do 
not exceed 27 million euro and that complies with the independency criterion (UNIZO, 2010, 
http://www.unizo.be/viewobj.jsp?id=27159). The matching procedure resulted in a final sample of 
875 (5 independent firms for each cross-border target5) independent, Flemish, non-financial firms 
that all dispose of the essential data. 
 
     Table 1 represents an overview of the annual (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) distribution of 
the acquired and independent firms sample. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
     Few acquisitions occurred in 2000 (during the Internet bubble), as only 8% of the acquired 
companies in the sample were taken over in 2000. The proportion of acquisitions in the following 
years is broadly comparable, with a peak of 30% in the last year, 2004. These trends hold for both 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The industry distribution in Panel B shows that more than 
half of the acquisitions in our sample occur in the (knowledge- or less knowledge-intensive) 
services sector. The industry distribution is comparable for domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. Roughly one third of the acquisitions occur in an unrelated industry (conglomerate 
merger), with equal proportions among the cross-border and the domestic samples. 
 
     The cross-border acquirers originate mainly from the Netherlands (24.00%), from the US 
(17.71%) and from France (15.43%). Many of them are also coming from nearby countries as 
Germany (8.57%), the UK (8.57%) and Ireland (5.14%). Most of the other bidders in our sample 
are located in European countries (Norway, Sweden, Italy,...), with only a minority coming from 
overseas, excluding the US (Canada, Kuwait). It is worthwhile noting that 31.4% of the cross-
border acquirers is listed, compared to only 11.5% of the domestic acquirers.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
     Table 2 provides an overview of the pre-acquisition characteristics of the sample firms. Both 
domestic and cross-border target firms are on average 18 years old in the year before their 
acquisition. As age is one of our matching criteria, the comparable independent firms have the 
same average age at that point in time. Further, the mean total assets of domestic targets (3,635 
thousand euro) and independent firms (3,818 thousand euro) are comparable, while those of cross-
border targets (7,245 thousand euro) are about twice as high. The same goes for the added value. 
The average profit, on the other hand, is comparable for cross-border targets and independent 
firms, but is much lower for domestic targets. In addition, domestic targets generally have the 
lowest sales (7,452 thousand euro) and cross-border targets the highest (15,411 thousand euro), 
while the average sales of independent firms are in between (12,467 thousand euro). The number 
of employees differs between the three types of firms, with cross-border targets employing 32 
people, domestic targets 20 people and independent firms 12 people on average. 
 
Research Method 
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 The matched sample is comparable to the 175 cross-border targets. As there are no statistically significant 
differences between the 175 cross-border and the 209 domestic targets, the independent firms can also be 
considered as comparable to the domestic targets. 
     To compare the evolution of the economic performance of acquired and independent 
companies, growth and performance measures in the year before the acquisition until four years 
after the acquisition are compared. The accounting data to compute growth in sales  
((salest-salest-1)/salest-1), net margin (EBITt/total assetst), asset turnover (salest/total assetst), and net 
return on assets (net profitt/total assetst) were retrieved from the Bel-First database. This database 
is provided by Bureau Van Dijk and contains financial statements and other financial information 
of Belgian companies. Outliers were excluded. An observation is considered an outlier if it is 
higher (lower) than the 75th (25th) percentile plus (minus) 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
Finally, the means of all variables were compared with bivariate t-tests. The means of cross-border 
and domestic targets were compared with those of independent firms and cross-border and 
domestic targets were compared to one another as well. 
 
RESULTS 
 
     Table 3 presents the results of the t-tests6. First, acquisition targets are different compared to 
independent companies before their acquisition. Target firms, on average, have a lower growth 
and performance in comparison to independent firms in the year before the acquisition. More 
precisely, especially domestic targets experience a lower growth in sales and lower margins. Their 
sales growth is even negative (-12.40% on average), while independent firms grow at a positive 
rate of 3.20% on average. The margin of domestic targets is 1.20% on average, while independent 
firms show statistically significantly higher margins of 3.40% on average. The asset turnover and 
return on assets do not differ between domestic targets and independent firms in the pre-
acquisition year. Target firms of cross-border acquirers on the other hand, have a sales growth, 
margin and asset turnover which is comparable to that of independent firms before the acquisition, 
but their return on assets is significantly lower (3.10% on average compared to 6.10% on average), 
suggesting that they use their assets less efficiently. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
     In the post-acquisition years, domestic targets continue to underperform compared to 
independent firms. Their growth in sales remains negative and lower than that of independent 
companies. Their margins remain at lower levels as well. Asset turnover of these companies is 
comparable to that of independent firms, showing that they use their assets equally efficiently. A 
lower margin, combined with comparable asset turnover, leads to lower return on assets of -6.88% 
on average (which was at a comparable level before the acquisition). 
 
     The post-acquisition evolution in the performance measures of cross-border targets is again 
different. In the year of the acquisition and the first post-acquisition year, cross-border acquisition 
targets have a sales growth which is negative and lower (-3.40% in year t and -5.60% in year t+1 
on average) than that of an independent firm (3.30% in year t and 2.00% in year t+1 on average). 
Thereafter, their growth gradually improves and reaches a level comparable to that of independent 
firms. 
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 The results for the gross margin and gross return on assets are comparable to those for the net margin and 
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     Interestingly, their margins do not only become comparable to, but outperform those of 
independent firms in the years following the acquisition7. Their return on assets only becomes 
significantly higher in the fourth year after the acquisition (8.50% compared to 6.20% for the 
independent firm on average). As both the net margin and the asset turnover are significantly 
higher, the higher return on assets is now driven by both factors. This higher return means that, in 
the fourth year after the acquisition, cross-border acquisitions benefit target firms through higher 
cost efficiencies and more efficient use of their assets. Independent companies on the other hand, 
use their assets more efficiently before the fourth post-acquisition year. 
 
     The last column of table 3 compares cross-border and domestic targets. Overall, they are 
comparable before the acquisition, except for the growth in sales which is significantly higher for 
cross-border (0.90% on average) than for domestic (-12.40% on average) target firms. After the 
acquisition, sales growth generally continues to be higher for the cross-border target firms. The net 
margin is higher for cross-border targets in most post-acquisition years, while the asset turnover 
does not substantially differ between the two types of firms. Combined, this leads to higher return 
on assets in most post-acquisition years for cross-border targets. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
     This study is one of the first large-scale longitudinal studies to empirically document what 
happens to an owner-managed company after it has been acquired. First, we show that domestic 
firms acquire firms with different pre-acquisition characteristics compared to cross-border 
acquirers. Domestic acquisition targets have a lower growth and lower margins, but comparable 
return on assets compared to independent companies. Cross-border acquisition targets, on the 
other hand, have comparable growth and margins as independent companies, but have a lower 
return on assets. 
 
     Second, the post-acquisition evolution is also different. Domestic acquisitions continue to 
perform worse than independent companies, resulting in lower return on assets. Overall, our 
results suggest that domestic acquisitions do not create value in the target company. Declining 
sales support the view that the disappearance of the entrepreneur as the driving force of the 
company has detrimental effects on the firm’s output. Low and continuously declining margins 
suggest that neither economies of scale or scope are realized, nor market power is exploited. Post-
acquisition integration seems to be difficult. Obviously, declining sales combined with lower 
margins lead to unsatisfactory, and even negative average returns on assets. 
 
     Cross-border acquisitions, on the other hand, lead to a drop in sales in the acquisition year and 
in the two years after the acquisition. It hence takes time to absorb the effects of operating under 
new ownership. Thereafter, sales grow at the same rate as independent companies. We hence did 
not find positive revenue-related synergies. Interestingly, owner-managed companies, acquired by 
an international company, show an almost immediate and consistent improvement in their 
margins, making them more cost efficient than independent companies. This outperformance is 
not driven by the relative strength of the parent companies’ economies as the real GDP growth, 
inflation and unemployment rates indicate that the health of the economies of Flanders, the 
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 A remarkable fact is that the average net margin is in some cases lower than the net return on assets (e.g. for 
cross-border targets in the acquisition year and the second, third and fourth post-acquisition year). This might 
be due to EBIT being lower than net income and would happen if a firm does not pay taxes and has a net 
interest income. Alternatively, this might also be driven by sample behavior, with more extremely low net 
margins compared to net return on assets, decreasing the average net margins. 
Netherlands, the US and France was roughly comparable in these years. Taken together, these 
results go against earlier evidence that it is easier to realize cost improvements in domestic 
acquisitions than in cross-border acquisitions. Clearly, results obtained from studying large 
takeovers cannot be transferred to owner-managed companies: other dynamics are at play. 
 
     As always, this study has limitations. The most obvious one is the fact that no confounding 
effects were considered. Further versions will therefore estimate changes in sales, margins and 
performance with multivariate models including, for example, whether the target was operating in 
the same industry, or whether the acquirer was listed. Second, the takeover targets are limited to 
Flemish companies. This has as major advantage (next to data availability) that all companies are 
exposed to the same context, such as the same legal and institutional environment. This might, 
however, limit the external validity of our findings. While we do not claim that our results have no 
geographical limitations, we feel that Flanders is a representative region for a major part of 
Continental Europe. Third, the variables are taken from the companies’ financial accounts. While 
the reliability of these data is relatively high in Flanders, especially margins and return on asset 
measures might be impacted by earnings management practices. Synergy motivated acquisitions 
generally affect performance in a positive way and are therefore characterized by higher quality 
earnings (Barragato and Markelevich, 2008; Zhang and Wang, 2007). Earnings management 
practices are especially prevalent in acquisitions with an agency or hubris motive, as these are 
typically value decreasing and negatively affecting performance. Earnings management is then 
used to hide the loss in value. However, earnings management is only possible in the short term. 
In the longer term, earnings management will be revealed. As we extend our post-acquisition 
analyses to four years, it is unlikely that earnings management drives our results. Fourth, we were 
not able to fully rule out alternative explanations. It might be, for example, that cross-border 
acquirers are better at identifying targets with high potential for improvement. If so, pre-
acquisition selection is more important than post-acquisition integration. 
 
     Our results are nevertheless important for exiting entrepreneurs, for stakeholders of target 
companies and for policy makers. First, entrepreneurs often have an emotional attachment to their 
company. Selling their company is then a major decision, which they will only want to take if they 
feel that the company will not be hampered by their leaving. Our results show that it is more 
beneficial if the company is taken over by an international company than by a domestic company. 
Domestic acquisitions lead, on average, to companies becoming smaller and less efficient in the 
medium term, while cross-border acquisitions lead to companies performing better and hence 
creating more value. Policy makers are often concerned about the fact that companies are “sold 
out” to foreign companies, fearing loss of economic value in their region. Our results show that 
this is not the case. Especially cross-border acquisitions are beneficial to target companies. More 
efforts are hence needed to make acquisition markets more efficient. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 (Panel A): Annual distribution of the acquisitions sample 
 
 Domestic Cross-border All acquisitions 
Year N % N % N % 
2000 18 8.61% 15 8.75% 33 8.59% 
2001 41 19.62% 47 26.86% 88 22.92% 
2002 31 14.83% 27 15.43% 58 15.10% 
2003 50 23.92% 38 21.71% 88 22.92% 
2004 69 33.01% 48 27.43% 117 30.47% 
Total 209 100.00% 175 100.00% 384 100.00% 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 (Panel B): Industry distribution of the sample firms 
 
 Domestic 
 targets 
Cross-border  
targets 
Independent  
firms 
Industry N % N % N % 
Manufacturing 88 42.11% 51 29.31% 195 22.29% 
High and medium-high technology 47 22.49% 24 13.79% 40 4.57% 
Medium-low and low technology 41 19.62% 27 15.52% 155 17.71% 
Services 110 52.63% 117 67.24% 572 65.37% 
Knowledge-intensive services 50 23.92% 70 40.23% 172 19.66% 
Less knowledge-intensive services 60 28.71% 47 27.01% 400 45.71% 
Other 11 5.26% 6 3.45% 108 12.34% 
Agriculture. utilities and construction 11 5.26% 6 3.45% 108 12.34% 
Total 209 100.00% 174 100.00% 875 100.00% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the sample firms 
 
 Domestic 
 targets 
Cross-border  
targets 
Independent  
firms 
Firm characteristic Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Age 18 19 18 17 18 15 
Total assets (th EUR) 3,635.49 4,442.87 7,245.44 8,982.75 3,817.64 4,761.62 
Added value (th EUR) 1,345.88 1,622.60 2,839.01 3,607.11 1,055.33 1,379.78 
Profit (th EUR) 11.71 187.24 35.46 447.80 34.40 83.58 
Sales (th EUR) 7,451.92 7,932.58 15,411.39 17,696.71 12,467.11 12,514.89 
N° of employees (FTE) 20 26 32 36 12 17 
 
Table 3: Results of tests on performance measures (t=acquisition year) 
The values in bold indicate significance at the 5% level or lower. 
Measure Year N 
Mean 
domestic 
(1) 
N 
Mean 
cross-border 
(2) 
N 
Mean 
independent 
(3) 
p-value 
(1) vs (3) 
p-value 
(2) vs (3) 
p-value 
(1) vs (2) 
Growth in 
Sales 
t-1 107 -0.124 90 0.009 1712 0.032 0.000 0.251 0.014 
t 109 -0.284 87 -0.034 1992 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.000 
t+1 100 -0.324 82 -0.056 1982 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t+2 89 -0.134 84 -0.002 1939 0.023 0.000 0.198 0.022 
t+3 76 -0.028 80 0.035 1875 0.035 0.002 0.972 0.200 
t+4 73 -0.113 75 0.027 1775 0.039 0.000 0.503 0.009 
        
 
  
Net Margin 
t-1 106 0.012 89 0.033 2089 0.034 0.000 0.946 0.051 
t 101 0.013 86 0.027 2084 0.035 0.000 0.120 0.242 
t+1 96 0.009 88 0.054  2044 0.036 0.000 0.002   0.000 
t+2 91 0.006 81 0.057 1988 0.039 0.000 0.002 0.000 
t+3 85 0.008 85 0.060 1924 0.043 0.000 0.006 0.000 
t+4 79 0.005 77   0.069 1800 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
Asset 
Turnover 
t-1 161 1.137 106 1.127 3931 1.057 0.399 0.549 0.943 
t 144 1.189 137 1.060 3964 1.033 0.118 0.789   0.344 
t+1 89 1.335 132 1.075 3962 0.996 0.006 0.436 0.102 
t+2 126 1.094 126 1.050 3930 0.951 0.160 0.328     0.748 
t+3 122 1.012 84 1.148 3874 0.901 0.264 0.039   0.407    
t+4 102    0.988 106 1.178 3718   0.865 0.246 0.003 0.201 
         
 
 
Net Return 
on Assets 
t-1 155 0.090 116 0.031 3593 0.061 0.098   0.000 0.537 
t 154 0.012 108 0.059   3626 0.060   0.000 0.902 0.396 
t+1 143 -0.159 115 0.044 3607 0.060 0.000 0.022 0.161   
t+2 134 -0.100 108 0.059 3581 0.060 0.000 0.845    0.025   
t+3 126 -0.025 106 0.071 3557 0.063 0.000 0.322 0.006 
t+4 117 -0.072 74 0.085  3397 0.062   0.000 0.011 0.067 
